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ABORTION RIGHTS
MOBILIZATION AND
RELIGIOUS TAX
EXEMPTIONS
CHARLES CAPETANAKIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he words of such an Act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance
before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-refer-
ence, exception upon exception-couched in abstract terms that offer no
handle to seize hold of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some
vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport...
Judge Learned Hand'
In 1979, lawyers working with the National Abortion Rights Action
League (known by the acronym "NARAL") started supplying the Inter-
nal Revenue Service with anti-abortion documents distributed by groups
connected with the Roman Catholic Church ("the Church").2 The lawyers
contended that these items proved that the Church had systematically
violated the law forbidding tax-exempt institutions from devoting a sub-
stantial amount of their activities to influencing legislation.' Then, in
1981, nine organizations and twenty individuals supporting a woman's
right to abortion commenced a suit against the Church,4 claiming the
* Law Clerk, Hon. Jose A. Gonzalez, Jr., U.S. District Judge (S.D. Fla.); B.S. 1983, New
York University; J.D. 1989, Fordham University School of Law. The author is also a Certi-
fied Public Accountant.
Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947), reprinted in Houck, With
Charity For All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1425 (1984).
2 See N.Y. Times, July 29, 1988, at A27, col. 1.
' See id.
See Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
see also In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1021 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990); In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156, 158
(2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 487 U.S. 72 (1988).
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Church, through its anti-abortion crusade, systematically violated Inter-
nal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) by substantially participating in "po-
litical activities."5 The plaintiffs also alleged they were disadvantaged po-
litically because only they abided by the section 501(c)(3) limitatigns,6
and that the government, through de facto subsidization, gave the Church
a benefit over the plaintiffs.7 The plaintiffs, therefore, called for the revo-
cation of the Church's tax-exempt status.8
Because the plaintiffs did not meet the Article III minimum require-
ments for standing, 9 the underlying issue still exists: To what degree can
a religious organization speak out on social issues in the public forum
before such speech has the appearance of political lobbying, thus endan-
gering the organization's tax-exempt status?
Recently, events throughout the United States have given rise to
what may be future challenges to the tax-exempt status of certain reli-
gious organizations, including the Church. In San Diego, a Catholic
Bishop barred a candidate for the State Assembly from receiving com-
munion because of her political stance in favor of readily obtainable abor-
tions.' In New York, Governor Mario Cuomo, John Cardinal O'Connor
and Auxiliary Bishop Austin Vaughan have been involved in a heated
public debate on the abortion issue; Auxiliary Bishop Vaughan was later
jailed for taking part in an anti-abortion protest." Finally, in Washing-
ton, D.C., the National Conference of Catholic Bishops announced they
would undergo a new nationwide anti-abortion campaign by hiring a pub-
lic relations firm and expending approximately five million dollars for re-
lated services."
Although the issue of abortion is not a political one according to
Church ideology, it cannot be denied that the problem has become in-
creasingly "politicized," to the extent that politicians commonly choose to
make their stance on abortion, "pro-choice" or "pro-life," a major plank
in their election platforms. Considering the large contributions to reli-
gious and private organizations who take a public stance on the issue,'3 it
is suggested that disputes over abortion be closely reviewed by religious
organizations everywhere for the potential impact on their tax status.
' See Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d at 158.
' See id. at 158-59.
See id. at 159.
1 See id.
9 See In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1021 (2d Cir. 1989), cert
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990); see infra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
10 See A Mistake in San Diego, AMERICA, Dec. 9, 1990, at 416.
" See Eston, Bishops, Politicians and the Abortion Crisis, TIME, Feb. 19, 1990, at 75.
" See Baker, The Bishops Under Fire, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 23, 1990 at 24.
,3 See Houck, supra note 1, at 1428 n.36 (estimated as high as $26 billion as far back as
1984).
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This Article will address the sensitive issues concerning the tax-ex-
empt status of religious organizations. First, it Will discuss the history of
the Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. ("A.R.M.") challenge against the
Church and the background of tax exemptions to religious organiza-
tions."' Second, the Article will outline various first and fifth amendment
challenges to religious tax exemptions.13 Third, the Article will examine
the constitutional standard of review for such cases.'" Fourth, the Article
will compare the A.R.M. challenge to past challenges. 7 Finally, recom-
mendations to Congress will be made in order to avoid the kind of confu-
sion Judge Hand spoke of in his Yale Law Journal article. 8
II. BACKGROUND OF THE A.R.M. CHALLENGE
In A.R.M. v. Regan,"9 the action against the two religious defendants,
The United States Catholic Conference ("USCC") and The National
Conference of Catholic Bishops ("NCCB") was dismissed because the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the religious defendants violated In-
ternal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3).2 ° The motions to dismiss submit-
ted by the other two defendants in the case, Treasury Secretary Regan
and Internal Revenue Commissioner Egger, were denied.2 '
Despite the dismissals in 1982 against the USCC and the NCCB,
A.R.M. served deposition subpoenas on the USCC and the NCCB seeking
various documents concerning the organizations' alleged political activi-
ties in 1983.22 Then, in 1985, the federal defendants renewed their motion
to dismiss based on Allen v. Wright,23 a 1984 United States Supreme
Court decision. The Allen Court had held that the parents of certain
black students had no standing to challenge the tax-exempt status of ra-
cially segregated private schools.2 ' Finding that Allen was not inconsis-
14 See infra notes 19-80 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 81-215 and accompanying text.
," See infra notes 216-39 and accompanying text.
"7 See infra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
"s See infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
20 See id. at 487. In granting the dismissal, the district court noted that the I.R.S. had
confirmed the religious defendants' tax-exempt status. The court also reasoned that the
plaintiffs had no direct grievance with the religious defendants and that the injuries alleg-
edly arose from unconstitutional government action. Id.
" See id. at 491. The district court found, inter alia, that the individual plaintiffs had
standing to sue. Id.; see also, A.R.M. v. Regan, 552 F. Supp. 364, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (deny-
ing federal defendants' motion for certification to court of appeals questions of whether
plaintiffs had standing and whether litigation could proceed in light of Anti-Injunction Act).
22 See In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d. 156, 159 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 487
U.S. 72 (1988).
23 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
2" See id. at 766.
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tent with their previous decisions, the federal district court once again
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.2
The USCC and the NCCB failed to produce the subpoenaed materi-
als in a timely manner, so the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York held the religious defendants in civil contempt
of court, and imposed sanctions.26 The contempt order was stayed pend-
ing appeal, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court.2 7 The Supreme Court later reversed and remanded the holding,
and instructed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether
the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction.28
On remand, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plain-
tiffs had not met the article III minimum requirements for standing.29
Thereafter, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for writ of
certiorari.2 0 Thus, it would appear that the Church's tax-exempt status
has been preserved for the present time.
III. BACKGROUND OF LIMITATIONS ON TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS'
LOBBYING ACTIVITIES
A. Background of Limitations
Dating back to 1802, legislatures have exempted religious organiza-
tions from taxation. 1 For instance, in 1813, Congress issued refunds to
religious organizations for import taxes paid by religious societies on reli-
gious articles. 2  Federal tax exemptions for religious organizations
originated with the passage of the Income Tax Act of 1894.33 A similar
exemption was included in the Income Tax Act of 1913"4 and subsequent
revenue acts.35
Prior to 1934, the only means of precluding tax-exempt status to or-
See A.R.M. v. Regan, 603 F. Supp. 970, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
See A.R.M. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
2 See In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 487
U.S. 72 (1988).
8 See United States Catholic Conference v. A.R.M., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2268, 2273 (1988).
28 See In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). The minimum standards to be alleged by a party seeking
such relief are set forth in Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, and include a legally cognizable injury
caused by the challenged conduct or law and judicial redressability.
2' A.R.M. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990).
"I See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 684-85 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
2 See id. at 677.
" See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894) (held unconstitutional in Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895)); see also Taxation With Representation v.
Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
2 See Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
38 See Taxation With Representation, 676 F.2d. at 736 n.36.
ABORTION AND TAX EXEMPTIONS
ganizations engaging in political activities was to prove that the circula-
tion of any " 'controversial or partisan propaganda'" was not for tax-ex-
empt reasons. s6 For instance, in Slee v. Commissioner,'7 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a district court
determination that the American Birth Control League was not eligible to
receive tax deductible contributions because the group distributed propa-
ganda to legislators and the public for the purpose of repealing certain
birth control laws.3 8
Lobbying limitations on exempt organizations came about in 1934,' 9
when Congress indicated that I.R.C. section 501(c)(3)' 0 organizations
could not substantially engage in lobbying activities and remain exempt
from taxation.4 1 Indeed, discussion on the Senate floor indicated Congress
was attempting to curb the possibility of abuse by exempt organizations
eligible to use tax-deductible contributions for lobbying activities." For
example, Senator Reed of the Senate Finance Committee stated that
"'[t]here is no reason in the world why a contribution made to [an ex-
empt organization] should be deductible ... if it is a selfish one made to
advance the personal interests of the giver of the money.' ,,13
Senator Harrison, another Finance Committee member, similarly ex-
plained that
'the attention of the Senate committee was called to the fact that there are
certain organizations which are receiving contributions in order to influence
legislation and carry on propaganda. The committee thought there ought to
be an amendment which would stop that, so that is why we have put this
amendment in the bill."
See Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should The Church Render
Unto Caesar ?, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 50, 68 (1976); see also Treas. Reg. 45, art. 517(1) (1919).
37 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
" See id. at 184-86. The League also published a magazine about abortion, maintained a
research and development department, and acted as a clinic. In Slee, Judge Hand reasoned
that such "[p]olitical agitation" was outside the purpose of tax exemption and the activities
were the exclusive purpose of the association, not ancillary practices. See id. at 185.
"o See Revenue Act of 1934, § 23(o)(2), 48 Stat. 690 (1934) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)
(Supp. 1990)).
1* A section 501(c)(3) organization generally is an entity organized for religious purposes
with activities that do not substantially issue propaganda, or otherwise influence legislation.
See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (Supp. 1990). Section 501(c)(3) was the first statutory limit on
lobbying activities of exempt organizations. Taxation With Representation of Washington v.
Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); see infra note 48 and
accompanying text (language of section 501(c)(3)).
41 See Taxation With Representation, 676 F.2d at 736.
4' See id.
" Id. (quoting 78 CONG. Rac. 5861 (1934) (statement of Senator Reed)).
4 Id. (quoting 78 CONG. REc 5959 (1934)) (statement of Senator Harrison). Senator Harri-
son was referring to amendment no. 19. See 78 CONG. REc. 7831 (1934) (statement of Sena-
tor Harrison).
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The effect of the 1934 amendment was twofold: it permitted insub-
stantial lobbying; yet it prohibited substantial lobbying activities even if
they were promoting the organization's primary purpose.45 In the case of
a religious organization, the organization risks losing its tax exemption
even though the political activities engaged in were religiously motivated
and promoted what may be seen as the organization's "primary
purpose.'46
B. Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) and Treasury Regulation
Section 1.501(c) (3)-1
Internal Revenue Code section 501(a) exempts from taxation certain
organizations described in section 501(c)."7 I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) ex-
cludes organizations operated exclusively for religious purposes when
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided
in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (in-
cluding the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign
on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.'
This statute does not require governmental approval of an organiza-
tion's activities, policies, or practices. 49 I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) merely
states that the organization has to meet certain requirements to remain
tax-exempt.8 0 Pursuant to Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1, an
organization must meet either an "organizational" or an "operational"
test to be exempt from taxation. 1
Under the "organizational" test, a religious organization must be or-
ganized exclusively for exempt purposes.2 An organization will fail this
test if its articles expressly empower it:
(i) To devote more than an insubstantial part of its activities to at-
tempting to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise; or
(ii) Directly or indirectly to participate in, or intervene in (including
" See Schwarz, supra note 36, at 68.
," Id.; see also Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
' 26 U.S.C § 501(a) (1988).
4 Id. § 501(c)(3) (1988). I.R.C. section 501(h)(5) allows certain charitable organizations to
elect to be governed by fixed guidelines while lobbying. Religious organizations, however, are
excluded from this treatment.
" See id. (no requirement for governmental approval); see also Note, The Revocation of
Tax Exemptions and Tax Deductions for Donations to 501(c)(3) Organizations on Statu-
tory and Constitutional Grounds, 30 UCLA L. REV. 156, 184 (1982).
00 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); see also Note, supra note 49, at 184.
6' Tress. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (1976).
5' Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1).
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the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on be-
half of or in opposition to any candidate for public office; or
(iii) To have objectives and to engage in activities which characterize it
as an "action" organization .... 5
The group in Slee " organized and declared its objectives "[t]o col-
lect, correlate, distribute and disseminate" information regarding concep-
tion, and to "enlist the support and co-operation" of lawyers and legisla-
tors to repeal or amend statutes which prevent conception."5 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a Board of Tax Appeals finding
that these political activities were substantial and thus revoked its tax-
exempt status." Other than the Slee decision, the "organizational" test
has not been extensively litigated. The majority of cases where an organi-
zation has had its tax-exempt status revoked have centered on the "oper-
ational" test.5
7
An organization is "operated exclusively" for an exempt purpose if it
primarily engages in an exempt activity expressed in I.R.C. section
501(c)(3), such as religion." Such organizations will pass the "opera-
tional" test. If a group's primary objective is obtainable only by legisla-
tion or defeat of proposed legislation, and it advocates or campaigns for
the attainment of that objective, it will be an "action" organization." A
group is also an "action" organization if a substantial part of its activities
attempts to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise. "Action"
organizations fail the operational test.60
In Church of Scientology v. Commissioner,"' a religious organiza-
tion's tax-exempt status was revoked because it engaged in businesses
whose earnings directly benefitted certain officials within the organiza-
tion."2 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that to qual-
ify for tax-exempt status, a religious organization must show that it is
operated not only for a religious purpose, but also exclusively for a reli-
gious or charitable purpose.6
'3 Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(3).
" See supra notes 37-38, 45-46 and accompanying text.
" Slee, 42 F.2d at 184.
See id. at 184-85.
57 See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United
States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1976).
" Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iv); see also Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 853-56.
'0 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1976); see also Christian Echoes 470 F.2d at 853-
56; Slee, 42 F.2d at 185.
823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).
82 See id. at 1312-13.
' See id. at 1315. An example of a church losing its tax-exempt status because it did not
1 175
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The Church of Scientology court recited four elements which com-
prise the operational test: (1) An organization's primary activities must
accomplish one or more of the tax-exempt purposes in section 501(c)(3);
(2) an organization's net income must not benefit private individuals; (3)
an organization must not spend a substantial part of its monies on pro-
grams intended to influence legislation or on political campaigns; and (4)
an organization must operate to serve valid public purposes and provide a
public benefit. Non-compliance with one of the four requirements triggers
the loss of tax-exempt status.6
4
A section 501(c)(3) organization,6 5 therefore, will lose its tax-exempt
status if it participates in a political campaign, or devotes a substantial
part of its efforts to lobbying. 6 An organization will automatically lose its
tax-exempt status if it participates in a single political campaign.6 7 The
term "substantial," however, is not statutorily defined, and tax-exempt
organizations are left without guidelines.6 "
Courts have measured "substantiality" by comparing the time and
money spent by the organization on lobbying in relation to all of its activ-
ities.6 9 Different approaches were considered to measure the impact of an
organization's activities on legislation or the public." However, there is
no statutory definition of "substantial" with regard to lobbying efforts.
operate exclusively for religious purposes within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) is First
Libertarian Church v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 396 (1980). There, the church's primary activi-
ties were to hold meetings before supper, sponsor a supper club and publish a newspaper
where some of the content of discussion was not religious, but political. Id. at 400-01. The
non-exempt activity was found to be a substantial part of the church's activity. Id. at 403-
05; see also Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B. 161 (exempt religious organization did not jeop-
ardize tax-exempt status by operating broadcasting station which gave equal opportunities
to variety of political candidates and viewpoints and made disclaimers that station had no
political viewpoint).
" Church of Scientology, 823 F.2d at 1315; see also Big Mama Rag v. United States, 631
F.2d 1030, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (denying organization's request for tax-exempt status
because its newspaper was "ordinary commercial publishing practice" commenting on com-
merce, politics and promoting lesbianism); Rev. Rul. 62-71, 1962-1 C.B. 95 (organization
primarily engaged in teaching and advocating of adoption of certain political and economic
theories denied section 501(c)(3) status because primary objectives attainable only through
legislation).
" See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
"6 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988); Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1 (1976).
67 See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
See Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 918-19 (1977).
" See Note, Political Activity and Tax-Exempt Organizations Before and After The Tax
Reform Act of 1969, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1114, 1124 (1970); see also Seasongood v. Com-
missioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
70 See Note, Charitable Lobbying Restraints and Tax Exempt Organizations: Old
Problems, New Directions?, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 337, 342 (1984).
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The lack of a statutory test caused uncertainty as to whether an or-
ganization was engaged in "substantial activities." ' For example, during
student anti-Vietnam war protests, colleges and universities became con-
cerned for their tax-exempt status because their campuses were used for
the demonstrations.72 Similarly, many organizations that participated in
the civil rights movement were counseled that any such support would
constitute lobbying, placing their tax-exempt status in jeopardy.7 3
The Tax Reform Act of 19767' attempted to remedy the lack of a
statutory test by providing that certain charitable organizations can elect
to be governed by fixed guidelines as to what constitutes substantial lob-
bying.7 5 Under those guidelines, when a specific percentage of funds is
spent to influence legislation, those lobbying activities will be deemed
substantial.76
Religious organizations, however, are explicitly ineligible to elect this
coverage 7 7 and must meet the organizational and operational tests in or-
der to keep their tax-exempt status.7 8 Congress' failure to define substan-
tiality7 '9 has left religious organizations to proceed without direction, as
Judge Hand described. 80
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The First Amendment
1. Freedoms of Speech and Petition
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part that: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
11 See id. at 342-43.
72 See Whelan, supra note 68, at 919.
7* See id.
"' Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1982).
7- 26 U.S.C. § 501(h) (1982); see also Note, supra note 70, at 343.
" See 26 U.S.C. § 501(h)(2)(B) (1988) ("The lobbying ceiling amount for any organization
for any taxable year is 150 percent of the lobbying nontaxable amount for such organization
for such taxable year, determined under section 4911."); id. § 4911(c)(2) (lobbying nontax-
able amount is lesser of $1,000,000 or amount determined by applying percentage to amount
of exempt purpose expenditures).
" See id. § 501(h)(5)(B).
78 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (1976).
79 See 122 CONG. REC. 13306-07 (1976) (Senate remarks); 122 CONG. REC. 12254-55, 16883-89
(1976) (House remarks). Congress indicated that section 501(h) does not apply to churches
and organizations affiliated with churches; however, the legislative history did not explain
why religious organizations were excluded from section 501(h) eligibility.
8* See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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speech ... or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."8' Many petitioners have
claimed that the first amendment is violated by restricting an organiza-
tions' tax-exempt status because the organization engages in lobbying. 2
The contention is that the government may not deny a benefit to a per-
son because he exercises a constitutional right such as lobbying.83 How-
ever, in Cammarano v. United States,s" the United States Supreme Court
held that Congress is not required by the first amendment to "subsidize,"
in effect, those engaged in certain political speech. 5
The Cammarano plaintiffs tried to deduct as business expenses on
their federal income tax returns expenses for publicity programs designed
to defeat issues in front of state legislatures.8 " The Supreme Court found
no distinction between expenses incurred in attempts to promote or de-
feat proposed legislation and those expenses incurred in the support or
combat of an initiative measure.8 7
The Cammarano plaintiffs argued that their case was similar to
Speiser v. Randall,S in which those who sought property tax exemptions
in California were required to sign a declaration stating they did not ad-
vocate the overthrow of the United States. The Speiser Court held that
the denial of an exemption to someone who engaged in free speech (i.e.,
the taxpayers who did not sign) was a violation of the first amendment.8 9
In contrast to Speiser, the Cammarano Court reasoned that the
plaintiff taxpayers were not denied their business expense deductions be-
cause they engaged in constitutionally protected speech."0 The Court held
that the taxpayers were merely required to pay for their lobbying activi-
ties on an equal footing with everyone else.91 The Court stated that Con-
gress determined that "since purchased publicity can influence the fate of
legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the community,
"I U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8 See, e.g., Regan.v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
" See id. at 542.
84 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
"' See id. at 513; see also Hirt, Why the Government is not Required to Subsidize Abortion
Counseling and Referral, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1895, 1912 n.81 (1988) ("The Supreme Court
has held in many contexts that a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a
fundamental right does not infringe that right and thus is not subject to strict constitutional
scrutiny.") (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549-50 (1983)).
8 See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at: 500-01. Plaintiffs, members of the Washington Beer Whole-
salers Association, incurred expenses resulting from an effort to persuade members of the
legislature to vote against proposed alcohol prohibition. Id. at 499-502.
8 See id. at 505.
88 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
88 See id. at 518.
*o See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513.
I See id.
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everyone in the community should stand on the same footing . . .,.
Therefore, "Congress ha[d] not infringed any First Amendment rights or
regulated any First Amendment activity," but had merely chosen not to
subsidize de facto an organization's political activities.9 8
The leading case involving the revocation of a religious organization's
tax exemption due to lobbying activities is Christian Echoes National
Ministry, Inc. v. United States.9" The plaintiff, Christian Echoes, was a
nonprofit religious corporation in Oklahoma established to maintain
weekly religious programs." To promote its brand of Christianity, the
ministry attempted to battle communism, socialism, and political liber-
alism, which it considered to be enemies of the group's faith." Christian
Echoes established anti-communist groups, and urged its members to be
politically active.17
The ministry's tax-exempt status, was revoked."' However, when the
ministry sued for a refund, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma held that the first amendment had been
violated." The court reasoned that the ministry's tax-exempt status was
revoked without a constitutionally justifiable cause.100 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and
held that the ministry's constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech
was not limited by section 501(c)(3).101
The Christian Echoes group was found to be "substantially active" in
its attempts to influence legislation because it urged ministry constituents
to write to their congressmen, work in local politics, support or oppose
certain legislation, and financially support certain causes.102 In addition
to influencing legislation, Christian Echoes intervened in political cam-
paigns by using broadcasts and publications to attack certain candidates,
specifically, President John F. Kennedy, and promote "conservatives"
such as Senator Strom Thurmond.10 3 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the ministry's lobbying, as balanced against the objectives and
circumstances of the organization, proved that "[a]n essential part of the
92 Id.
9' Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (citing Cammanaro,
358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
94 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
" Id. at 851.
" Id. at 852.
97 Id. at 852, 855.
98 See id. at 852-53.
9 See id. at 856-57.
100 See id. at 856.
101 Id. at 856-57.
102 Id. at 855-56.
103 Id. at 856.
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[ministries'] program ... was to promote desirable governmental
policies .... "1104
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the lobby-
ing activities of the ministry were not ancillary practices, but substantial
and continuous activities.108 Despite being religiously motivated, the
court held that these were not activities that Congress had intended ex-
empt organizations to engage in.0 6 The court reasoned:
The Congressional purposes evidenced by the 1934 and 1954 amendments
are clearly constitutionally justified in keeping with the separation and neu-
trality principles particularly applicable in this case and, more succinctly,
the principle that government shall not subsidize, directly or indirectly,
those organizations whose substantial activities are directed toward the ac-
complishment of legislative goals or the election or defeat of particular
candidates.0'0
The rationale of Christian Echoes was adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washing-
ton.'0 8 In Regan, the Court held that an organization whose activities sub-
stantially consisted of lobbying was not entitled to section 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt status.109 The Court, citing Cammarano,"° reasoned that Con-
gress was not required, pursuant to the first amendment, to subsidize the
plaintiffs' substantial lobbying activities."'
Taxation With Representation of Washington ("TWRW") assumed
the activities of two non-profit corporations." 2 One of the corporations,
Taxation With Representation ("TWR"), was organized to promote what
it believed to be the "public interest" of federal taxation through influ-
encing legislation." 3  TWR had tax-exempt status under section
501(c)(4).14 The other group, Taxation With Representation Fund
,04 Id. at 855.
100 Id. at 856.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 857.
1O8 461 U.S. 540 (1983). Regan involved, inter alia, a fifth amendment challenge to section
501(c)(3), as the taxpayer alleged that section 501(c)(19), which allowed veterans' groups to
receive tax-deductible donations and lobby, violated the equal protection clause. See infra
notes 191-199, and accompanying text.
o See id. at 545-47.
"0 See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
" Regan, 461 U.S. at 546 (citing Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513).
"' See id. at 543.
"' See id. at 541-42.
,14 See id. at 543. Section 501(c)(4) provides tax exemption for
[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for
the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of
which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particular
municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable,
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("TWRF"), was organized to promote TWRW's goals through publication
and circulation of a journal espousing its political philosophy, and
through litigation."' TWRF had tax-exempt status under section
501(c)(3)."'
TWR was subsequently denied its tax-exempt status and challenged
the constitutionality of section 501(c)(3)."1 The Tax Court, relying on
Cammarano," held that because TWR's admitted primary activity was
lobbying, no first amendment violation had occurred. 19 This decision was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
which also cited Cammarano and distinguished Speiser,'2" holding that
TWR failed the "organizational" test under Treasury Regulation
1.501(c)(3)-1. 1' 1
TWRW's attack on section 501(c)(3)'s constitutionality began in
1979.22 Again, the Tax Court held that, even though lobbying is pro-
tected under the first amendment 23 and there is a deep national obliga-
tion to the principle that debate on public issues should be vigorous and
wide-open,'2  section 501(c)(3) did not require certain speech in order to
gain a tax benefit like the violation in Speiser.12 5 Thus, there was no de-
nial of a tax benefit for engaging in free speech.
26
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
educational, or recreational purposes.
26 U.S.C § 501(c)(4) (1988).
"' See Regan, 461 U.S. at 543.
" See id. For purposes of this Article, taxpayers who contribute to section 501(c)(3) organi-
zations may deduct those contributions for purposes of Federal Income Tax. Contributions
to section 501(c)(4) organizations are not deductible. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2) (1988). Inter-
nal Revenue Code section 501(c)(4) allows organizations to promote social welfare and re-
main tax-exempt. See id. § 501(c)(4). Finally, section 501(c)(3) organizations who can cease
to qualify for tax-exemption due to their lobbying activities may not be treated as a section
501(c)(4) organization. See id. § 504(a); see also supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
"7 Taxation With Representation v. United States, No. 75-891-A, slip op. (E.D. Va. Sept.
28, 1976), reprinted in 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) para. 9693 (1976); see also Taxation With
Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 717 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
"8 See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
11 Taxation With Representation, 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at para. 9693.
"20 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
121 See Taxation With Representation v. United States, 585 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979); See also supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
'21 Taxation With Representation v. Blumenthal, No. 78-834, slip op. (D.D.C. Jan. 31,
1979), reprinted in 79-1 U.S. Tax Cases (CCH) para. 9185 (1979).
"' See, e.g., Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
137-38 (1961).
"' See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
'" See Taxation With Representation of Washington v. Blumenthal, No. 78-834, slip op.
(D.D.C. 1979), reprinted in 79-1 U.S. Tax Cases (CCH) para. 9185 (1979).
126 Id.
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Columbia affirmed the Tax Court's decision.127 However, the same court,
sitting en banc, reversed the trial court on the ground that section
501(c)(3) violated the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment,
rather than reversing the case on first amendment grounds.2 8 The Su-
preme Court, however, held that there was no fifth amendment violation,
and found no first amendment violation as well.'29
It appears then that any attempt by plaintiffs such as A.R.M.'30 to
assert that section 501(c)(3) inhibits freedom of speech will be unproduc-
tive. Courts to date have consistently held that, though an individual has
a right to lobby, Congress has no obligation to fund that right; section
501(c)(3), therefore, does not inhibit free speech.''
2. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
The first amendment to the United States Constitution states in
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . 132 The plaintiffs in Chris-
tian Echoes"' contended that since their tax-exempt status was revoked
without a constitutional reason, the ministry could not freely exercise its
religion. 3 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dis-
agreed and held that section 501(c)(3) did not violate the free exercise
clause of the first amendment. 3 5 The court reasoned that the interest of
separating church and state outweighed the denial of the ministry's tax-
exempt status.'3 6 Christian Echoes, additionally, was not unconstitution-
ally hindered in the promotion of its mission merely because it lost its
tax-exempt status.
1 3 7
It is well settled that legislation does not counter " 'the Establish-
117 Taxation With Representation of Washington v. Blumenthal, No. 79-1464, slip op. (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 14, 1981), reprinted in 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) para. 9329 (1981).
" See Taxation With Representation of Washington v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 740 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev'd, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). TWRW's constitutional challenge of section 501(c)(3) was
based on the fact that veterans' organizations could remain tax-exempt under section
501(c)(19) regardless of their political activities. Id. at 742; see infra notes 170-199 and ac-
companying text (discussing fifth amendment challenge).
129 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 548. The Court reasoned that no first amendment violation had
occurred because "veterans' organizations that qualify under section 501(c)(19) are entitled
to receive tax-deductible contributions regardless of the content of any speech they may use,
including lobbying." Id.
"I See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
" See Regan, 461 U.S. at 546.
132 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
" See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 856.
Id. at 856-57.
36 Id. at 857.
" Id. at 854-56.
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ment Clause if it has a secular legislative purpose, if its principal or pri-
mary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and if it does not foster
an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.' "8 Plaintiffs at-
tacking tax exemptions for religious organizations have argued that de
facto subsidies to such organizations (through tax exemptions) are pro-
hibited "entanglements. '"139 In Walz v. Tax Commission1 4 0 however, the
Supreme Court made it clear that this was not the case, at least concern-
ing property tax exemptions."14
The Walz case involved a plaintiff seeking the revocation of property
tax exemptions for religious groups." 2 The essence of the Walz complaint
was that by providing a property tax exemption to religious organizations,
the plaintiff, a property owner, was indirectly required to make certain
contributions to religious groups and the government was therefore "es-
tablishing religion."'1 3
The Walz Court's review of religious organizations was limited to the
organization's property tax exemptions. However, the Court's analysis
would also seem to apply to the question of whether the government's
attack on a religious group's basic tax-exempt status because of the
group's lobbying activities inhibits religion. The Walz Court reviewed the
history of tax exemptions for religious institutions to determine whether
these tax exemptions were intended to establish or interfere with reli-
gion." Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held that the legis-
lative purpose of property tax exemptions was not to advance nor inhibit
religion."14 The New, York property tax exemption at issue was not
deemed an attempt at establishing religion, but an accommodation to re-
ligious groups from property tax burdens levied on private organizations
"' Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (quoting Committee for Public Education v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980)). In Harris, the Court struck down a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Hyde Amendment holding that there is no constitutional right to federal fund-
ing for an abortion. Harris, 448 U.S. at 369.
139 See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-75 (1970).
140 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
141 Id. at 675.
"' Id. at 666.
113 Id. at 667.
14 Id. at 668-72.
145 Id. at 672. As the Chief Justice stated:
[P]roperty tax exemption is neither . . . sponsorship nor hostility .... [Clertain
entities that exist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that
foster its "moral or mental improvement," should not be inhibited in their activities
by... taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes. It
has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such;
rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of religious worship.
Id. at 672-73.
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operating for profit. 14
The Walz Court also reviewed the effect of the tax exemptions to
determine whether there was "government entanglement." The Court
held that the elimination of property tax exemptions would lead to ex-
panded government involvement because church property would undergo
tax valuation, and possibly, tax liens, foreclosures, or other related
litigation.14 7
The Court further reasoned that since tax exemptions were not direct
money payments to the religious institutions, no entanglement existed. 148
If the government were to transfer part of its revenue to religious organi-
zations, detailed administrative guidelines for the enforcement of govern-
ment standards would follow.1" With tax exemptions, however, the reli-
gious organizations merely abstain from supporting,the government. 150
Because there is no direct money subsidy, there is no "relationship
pregnant with involvement," 5" and presumably, no government entangle-
ment. As the Walz Court found no entanglement was created through
property tax exemptions for religious institutions, it is conceivable courts
might similarly find that lobbying restrictions on religious organizations
wishing to remain tax-exempt would not be entanglement. Exemptions
for religious organizations from government regulation do not involve af-
firmative aid or subsidies, and do not condone government
endorsement.""
', Id. at 673.
I4 ld. at 674.
14 Id. at 675; but see Regan , 461 U.S. at 544 ("A tax exemption has much the same effect
as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income."
Thus, tax exemptions are similar to subsidies). See supra notes 108-131 and accompanying
text.
' Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.
1o Id. As Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion:
Tax exemptions and general subsidies, however, are qualitatively different. Though
both provide economic assistance, they do so in fundamentally different ways. A sub-
sidy involves the direct transfer of public monies to the subsidized enterprise and
uses resources enacted from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, on the other hand,
involves no such transfer. It assists the exempted enterprise only passively, by reliev-
ing a privately funded venture of the burden of paying taxes.
Id. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
' Id. at 675; see also Schachner, Religion and the Public Treasury After Taxation With
Representation of Washington, Mueller and Bob Jones, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 275, 284-85
(1984).
162 A prime example would be property taxes. See Marshall & Blomgren, Regulating Reli-
gious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 329 (1986);
Note, supra note 49, at 184; see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507
(1970) (schools that teach both religious and secular class material do not fall within juris-
diction of NLRB due to establishment clause).
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3. Government's Purpose Behind Religious Tax Exemptions
There are many purposes behind religious tax exemptions. One such
purpose reflects governmental concern about their potential abuse by
charities. As mentioned, Congress was worried that charities would use
tax-deductible sums to finance the expression of their personal con-
cerns. 153 These apprehensions were eased by Treasury Regulation
1.501(c)(3)-1, which denies tax-exempt status to organizations engaged in
substantial lobbying for particular legislation. 15"
In Walz, Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, discussed the
government's basic purposes for property tax exemptions to religious
groups. Justice Brennan reasoned that religious organizations are exempt
from property taxes because the groups "contribute to the well-being of
the community in a variety of nonreligious ways .... "15 A religious com-
munity will often use the same personnel and resources for secular and
religious functions.18 6 The people who gather in religious facilities for
worship may also participate in sporting or charity events in those facili-
ties.1 " Justice Brennan reasoned that the organizations alleviate the gov-
ernment's duty to support the religious activities, a duty that would have
to be met through taxation. In the alternative, Justice Brennan stated, if
the activities were left unsupported, the community would suffer."
Another legislative purpose behind property tax exemptions to reli-
gious organizations is based on the belief that the organizations "uniquely
contribute to the pluralism of American society by their religious activi-
ties." 8 9 Justice Brennan reasoned that the government may extend prop-
erty tax exemptions to religious institutions, for "each group contributes
to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a
vigorous, pluralistic society."1 60
These legislative purposes were not designed to impose religious ac-
tivities into a secular atmosphere, unlike, for example, laws promoting
prayer in public schools.1 6 ' Justice Brennan reasoned that property tax
exemptions do not promote any particular activity of religious organiza-
tions, but merely assist such organizations in exchange for their positive
impact on American society "by leaving each free to come into existence,
",3 See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also, 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934) (state-
ment of Sen. Reed); cf. Regan, 461 U.S. at 550.
151 See, e.g., Regan, 461 U.S. at 546; Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513.
15 Walz, 397 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
160 Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
I57 d. (Brennan, J., concurring).
'5 Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
159 Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
0 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
"I Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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then to flourish or wither, without being burdened by real property
taxes.""6 2
Again, the Walz Court's analysis concerning property tax exemptions
for religious institutions would seem to apply to the general tax exemp-
tions of those organizations. In addition to the benefit the public receives
from the religious organization, tax exemptions are granted because the
relief from using public funds to support those benefits actually has the
effect of compensating the government for services it would otherwise be
forced to provide. " " The limitations concerning lobbying in the Treasury
Regulations, however, stem from the Congressional policy that the gov-
ernment should not subsidize substantial activities intend to influence
legislation or to affect politics. 64
Indeed, as the Regan 65 Court stated: "Congress ... has the authority
to determine whether the advantage the public would receive from addi-
tional lobbying by charities is worth the money the public would pay to
subsidize that lobbying "6.... "I Because the legislative history points to
the fact that Congress wanted to avoid exempt organizations using tax-
deductible contributions to lobby, 6 7 and because there is no doubt as to
Congress' authority to enact a statute such as section 501(c)(3),' 68 it fol-
lows that Congress might logically decide that charities could not engage
in political lobbying and remain tax-exempt at the expense of non-ex-
empt taxpaying political organizations."6 '
B. The Fifth Amendment
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. '1 70 Those who protest against section 501(c)(3) have
alleged that the statute arbitrarily discriminates in favor of religious orga-
nizations.1 71 Basically, fifth amendment challenges to the statute have
162 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). The supplying of such teaching materials, it was deter-
mined in Walz, was not manifesting any legislative purpose to aid a religion. Instead, that
aid was merely seen as an accommodation to religion. Id. at 671-72 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
103 See H.R. REP. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1939) (reprinted in Christian Echoes, 470
F.2d at 854.
164 Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 854.
105 See supra notes 108-129 and accompanying text.
166 Regan, 461 U.S. at 550.
107 See 78 CONG. REC. 5861, 5959 (1934).
10 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 550.
100 See id.
170 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
171 See Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 857; supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text; see
also Regan, 461 U.S. at 546; Americans United, Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1181 (D.C.
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been dismissed because there is a reasonable relationship to a proper gov-
ernment objective.'
In Walz, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion discussed the govern-
ment's two secular purposes for granting property tax exemptions to reli-
gious groups." 8 First, religious groups strengthen the community in a va-
riety of nonreligious ways, including bearing burdens ordinarily assumed
by the government. 7 4 Second, the government grants religious organiza-
tions tax exemptions because they characteristically augment the plural-
ism of American society by their religious endeavors. 75
In Christian Echoes, the ministry complained that the government
had arbitrarily and intentionally revoked its tax-exempt status. 76 The
court held that the taxpayer did not meet its burden of proving it was
discriminated against based on religion, race, politics, or any other classi-
fication, and dismissed the complaint.' The fact that the Commissioner
did not revoke the tax-exempt status of an organization similar to the
Christian Echoes ministry did not amount to a fifth amendment
violation.1 7 8
The organization in "Americans United," Inc. v. Walters,'7 9 was in-
corporated as "Protestants and Other Americans for Separation of
Church and State."18 0 The organization's tax-exempt status was revoked
because the organization devoted a substantial part of its activities to in-
fluencing public opinion, and worked to repeal aid to private schools and
prevent aid to church schools."8 ' The plaintiffs argued that their fifth
amendment rights were violated because larger, wealthier organizations
could expend the same amount of time and money for activities which
Cir. 1973), rev'd, Comm'r v. Americans United, 416 U.S. 752 (1974); Schwarz, supra note 36,
at 77.
'71 See, e.g., Regan, 461 U.S. at 548; Americans United, 477 F.2d at 1181; Christian Echoes,
470 F.2d at 857.
173 Walz, 397 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17, See id. at 687-88 (Brennan, J., concurring); Note, The Tax Code's Differential Treat-
ment of Lobbying Under Section 501(c) (3): A Proposed First Amendment Analysis, 66 VA.
L. REV. 1513, 1514-15 (1980) (Congress exempted religious charities from federal taxation in
belief that such organizations would perform valuable public services); see also Christian
Echoes, 470 F.2d at 854; H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th CONG., 3d Sess. 19 (1939) ("the Govern-
ment is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds.
17 Walz, 397 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also supra notes 159-162 and ac-
companying text.
176 Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 857; see supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
17 Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 857.
178 Id. at 857-58.
179 477 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
110 Id. at 1172.
181 Id.
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might be classified as lobbying, yet would pass the "substantial activity"
test because these activities are insubstantial in relation to the organiza-
tion's size. 82
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded the case in order to determine whether the plaintiff was discrimi-
nated against. 18 3 The court, however, expressed no opinion on the merits
of the fifth amendment claim,"8 4 and the case was ultimately resolved on
jurisdictional grounds." 5
This de facto distinction between large and small tax-exempt organi-
zations, and the fact that "substantial" has never been definedwith re-
spect to religious organizations, 6 may provide those who wish to attack
tax exemptions for religious organizations with a fifth amendment basis
to do so. Because there are many purposes behind religious tax exemp-
tions, ' it seems unlikely that courts will find a constitutional violation.
In light of Cammarano,'" religious organizations who lobby for legisla-
tion might not unconstitutionally be denied tax-exempt status, but may
be forced to pay for their lobbying activities as with other groups.'
The complaint in Regan' centered on section 501(c)(19), which
gives veterans' organizations tax-exempt status no matter how much they
lobby.' 9 1 The plaintiff argued that because Congress chose to grant tax
exemptions to certain lobbying groups, but not the plaintiff's, a fifth
amendment violation existed.' 2
Generally, a non-suspect statutory class will not violate an individ-
ual's fifth amendment rights if the class is rationally related to a legiti-
mate government purpose.9 3 The Regan Court found that the statute in
question was not intended to suppress any thoughts or actions, or create
any suspect classifications.'" The Court stated: "The distinction between
veterans' organizations and other charitable organizations is not at all like
distinctions based on race or national origin.' 9 5 The Regan Court dis-
missed a strict scrutiny test because the "legislature's decision not to
82 Id. at 1173, 1181-83.
'. Id. at 1181-83.
' Id. at 1183.
Alexander v. "Americans United," Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 763 (1974).
, See supra notes 69-80, and accompanying text.
's See supra notes 158-162, 173-175 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
188 See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513.
188 See supra notes 108-131 and accompanying text.
1R1 Began, 461 U.S. at 546.
18 Id. at 547.
113 Id.; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980).
184 Regan, 461 U.S. at 548.
19 Id.
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subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe that
right. .. ."'" The plaintiffs still enjoyed their constitutional rights and
could lobby.' Congress could rationally "subsidize" lobbying by veter-
ans' organizations due to their service to the United States, because re-
warding such service was seen as a legitimate governmental purpose.198
C. Vagueness of Section 501(c)(3) and its Regulations
Attacks have been made on section 501(c)(3) on grounds of vague-
ness. The focus of the discussion centers on the meaning of the term
"substantial." 199 Similar ambiguities appear to stem from phrases such as
"carrying on propaganda," "attempting to influence legislation," and
"participate in . . . any political campaign. "200 The result is that a reli-
gious organization is left without any guidelines as to what they can do,
and thus, their first amendment rights may be impaired.
21
1
When the exercise of a first amendment right is involved, the stan-
dards of judging a vague law are narrow.202 The concerns over vagueness
center on giving proper notice, so the organization affected by the law will
be informed of the statute's meaning. 03 Secondly, a statute must contain
explicit guidelines for the purpose of avoiding arbitrary and discrimina-
tory law enforcement. 20
4
In United States v. Big Mama Rag, 08 the plaintiff, a feminist organi-
zation, was denied tax-exempt status because the newspaper it published
as its primary activity was an ordinary commercial concern, although it
served as a vehicle for promoting plaintiffs social and political viewpoints
as well as what plaintiff considered the "virtues" of lesbianism.20 6 Plain-
tiff challenged the use of the term "educational" in the treasury regula-
tions as unconstitutionally vague.207 The Court of Appeals for the District
'" Id. at 549 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 470 (1977) (equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment did not require state par-
ticipating in medicaid program to pay expenses incident to non-therapeutic abortions).
197 See, e.g., Taxation With Representation v. United States, 585 F.2d 1219, 1224 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979).
190 Regan, 461 U.S. at 550-51; see also, Note, supra note 70, at 355.
'9 See supra notes 69-80, 187-199 and accompanying text.
200 See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 36, at 77.
201 See id.
202 Big Mama Rag v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
202 Id. (citing Smith v. Groguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974)); see also Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
204 Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d. at 1035 (citing Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620
(1976), Groguen, 415 U.S. at 572-73, and Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
170 (1972)).
205 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
200 Id. at 1032-33.
207 Id. at 1035.
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of Columbia Circuit found that the term "educational" did not depend on
the nature of the organization or the strength of its language.2 °0 The court
concluded that while the I.R.S. did not discriminate on the basis of sexual
preference,""' the definition of "educational" was not specific enough to
pass constitutional muster.
210
The definition of the term "substantial" has also been challenged."'
While Congress tried to quantify the meaning of "substantial" by enact-
ing section 501(h), 12 Congress excluded religious organizations.1 3
The Supreme Court has not yet considered the vagueness of any part
of section 501(c)(3) or its regulations. " " It seems unlikely, however, that
the statute will be struck down on vagueness grounds, as its constitution-
ality has previously been upheld on other first and fifth amendment
challenges. 21
5
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Courts have not agreed on a proper standard for review of lobbying
restrictions. 16 In Taxation With Representation of Washington v. Re-
gan, 1 7 the circuit court majority adopted a "heightened" or mid-level
scrutiny test,21 s while the dissent forwarded a "rational basis" test.2" The
Supreme Court later reversed, holding that the rational basis test ap-
plied.220 In Taxation With Representation v. United States,22" ' a rational
basis test was discussed by the majority, 222 while Judge Winter, dissent-
ing in part, spoke of an "exacting scrutiny" test.22
A statute will be subject to a "strict scrutiny" test if it impairs upon
a fundamental constitutional right or discriminates against a suspect
class. A statute not burdening a suspect or quasi-suspect class or interfer-
108 Id. at 1038-39.
209 Id. at 1039.
l Id. at 1039. The circuit court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the
case so the district court could apply a standard other than the "full and fair exposition"
test. Id. at 1039-40. The case, however, was settled out of court.
... See supra notes 69-90, 186-198 and accompanying text.
..2 Section'501(h) specifies percentages of money expenditures to influence legislation. See
26 U.S.C. § 501(h) (1988).
2 See id. § 501(h)(5).
See, Schwarz, supra note 36, at 77.
210 See, e.g., Regan, 461 U.S. at 549.
218 See Note, supra note 70, at 348.
217 676 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
01 Id. at 723-24, 728-30.
019 Id. at 757 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
020 See Regan, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983).
22 585 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 905 (1979).
" Id. at 1224.
222 Id. at 1225 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ing with a fundamental right will pass constitutional muster, however, if
it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest." The Regan
Court held that the lobbying restrictions at issue did not interfere with
fundamental individual rights.22 5 The Court reasoned that although an
individual has a fundamental right to lobby under the first amendment,
Congress has no obligation to fund that right,2 6 and a strict scrutiny test
was unnecessary. 2 7 The Regan Court relied in part on Harris v. Mc-
Rae,22 8 which upheld the constitutionality of legislation denying federal
funding for abortions or abortion counseling.22 9 The Harris Court held
that although a woman may have a right to an abortion under Roe v.
Wade, the government is under no obligation to fund that abortion.2 3 0
The Regan Court held that the lobbying restrictions of section
501(c)(3)" 11 and it's regulations do not infringe upon any such classifica-
tion. 2 Indeed, as the WaIz 23 3 Court stated, the legislature "has not sin-
gled out one particular church or religious group[.] . . . [R]ather, it has
granted exemption [from property taxes] to all houses of religious wor-
ship .... ,234 The appropriate test, therefore, must be whether the statute
and regulations have a rational relation to a legitimate government
objective.2 3 5
As previously explained, there are many legislative purposes behind
the policy of allowing religious groups to remain tax-exempt.236 In the
A.R.M. scenario, courts have held that I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) and Trea-
sury Regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1 are rationally related2 3 7 to a legitimate gov-
4 See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988).
22 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 548-49.
2 Id. at 548.
227 Id. at 548-49. "The distinction between veterans' organizations and other charitable or-
ganizations is not at all like distinctions based on race or national origin." Id. at 548. A
"heightened scrutiny" test, one which falls between the "strict scrutiny" and "rational rela-
tion" tests, is similarly unnecessary. See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 457-58. The heightened scru-
tiny test has been applied in cases which involved classifications based on sex, religion, race
or unacceptable distinctions. Id.; see also Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 857.
28 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
" See Regan, 461 U.S. at 547.
220 See Harris, 448 U.S. at 322.
"2 See supra notes 47-80 and accompanying text.
222 Cf. Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 857.
222 See supra notes 139-151 and accompanying text.
224 Walz, 397 U.S. at 673.
235 See Kadrmas, 487 U.S at 461-62.
236 See supra notes 153-169 and accompanying text. As the Tenth Circuit in Christian Ech-
oes stated: "[w]e hold that the Regulation [1.503(c)(3)-1] properly interprets the intent of
Congress." Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 854-55.
237 Social and economic legislation like the statute and regulations at issue carry "a pre-
sumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and
irrationality." Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462 (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32
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ernmental interest.2 3  Therefore, as the Regan Court held, section
501(c)(3) does not violate the first and fifth amendments. 28
VI. THE A.R.M. CHALLENGE AND SIMILAR PROBLEMS
Any future first amendment attack on section 501(c)(3)'s constitu-
tionality will probably fail, because of the precedents set in Cammarano,
Christian Echoes, Walz, and Regan. Those courts held that while section
501(c)(3) appeared on the surface to favor the free speech and petition
rights of certain organizations over those of other similar entities, possi-
bly impairing the latter's financial well-being," '4 after applying the appro-
priate legal analysis, the first amendment was not offended.2 '
Fifth amendment equal protection allegations may prove to be chal-
lenges to section 501(c)(3)'s constitutionality due to the legislature's fail-
ure to define "substantial."" 2 It presently appears that section 501(c)(3)
does not violate the fifth amendment, because courts have held its en-
forcement does not discriminate against any specific group,243 and that
the government has a legitimate purpose for allowing certain organiza-
tions, including religious organizations, to remain tax-exempt. 2"
Organizations that have had their tax-exempt status revoked clearly
devote a large part of their finances and activities toward what may prop-
erly be characterized as political propagandizing. 24 5 Again, the fact that
lobbying may be a substantial part of an organization's activities while
the same amount of such activity would be insubstantial to a larger or-
ganization will probably not sustain a fifth amendment challenge., 6
Tax-exempt organizations, even those with a religious mission,
should nevertheless be careful about becoming embroiled in what are es-
sentially political campaigns. Section 501(c)(3) states that religious orga-
(1981)).
'3' See, e.g., Regan, 461 U.S. at 548-50. Because legislatures are more familiar with local
conditions than the courts, the presumption of rationality must be overcome by an explicit
demonstration by the legislation's attacker. Id. at 547-48. As the Regan Court illustrated,
"[i]t is not irrational for Congress to. decide that tax-exempt charities . . . should not fur-
ther benefit at the expense of taxpayers at large by obtaining a further subsidy for lobby-
ing." Id. at 550.
209 See id. at 545-50.
240 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 548; Walz, 397 U.S. at 674-75; Camrnmarano, 358 U.S. at 513;
Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 857.
241 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-75; Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 856-57.
s' See supra notes 69-90, 187-199 and accompanying text.
'43 See Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 857. '
144 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 546 (tax exemptions in general); Walz, 397 U.S. at 687-89 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (property taxes).
2"' See, e.g., Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 852, 855; see also supra notes 94-108 and accom-
panying text.
240 See, e.g., Regan, 461 U.S. at 548; see also supra notes 191-199 and accompanying text.
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nizations must not significantly participate in, or intervene in, the sphere
of public politics. Even though tax exemptions for religious organizations
have existed for years,2 4 7 that fact alone is not an impenetrable defense to
an attack based upon specific conduct.
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts have not been afraid to uphold the revocation of an organiza-
tion's tax exemption when its activities blatantly violate section 501(c)(3).
Activities including the widespread distribution of propaganda,24 8 large
efforts to influence a political candidate's campaign through money 49 and
the media,2 5 0 and intense political lobbying251 have been easy targets for
the Internal Revenue Service.
The recent hiring of a public relations firm by the Church to promote
its position against abortion might conceivably lead to a reevaluation of
its tax-exempt status. Although the issue of abortion transcends mere
politics and goes to the heart of Roman Catholic philosophy, as a social
phenomenon, the issue has become increasingly politicized. The five mil-
lion dollars the Church anticipates to spend in its mission against abor-
tion, although not substantial in relation to the Church's entire budget,
would probably be a factor in a reconsideration of its section 501(c)(3)
status, especially if increased expenditures and other actions are taken in
the future.
One forum in which viewpoints on politically charged issues such as
abortion could be presented without endangering a religious organiza-
tion's tax-exempt status is an obvious one-its individual houses of wor-
ship. An aggressive attempt to enter the political arena on the abortion
(or any other politicized issue) may create difficulties in maintaining an
organization's basic federal tax exemption. The real responsibility lies
with Congress, as a legislative reexamination of the scheme of lobbying is
warranted. Congress can start by proposing specific guidelines to define
the term "substantial." Exempt organizations will then be confident that
a particular level of activity can be carried on without financial hazard,
and non-exempt organizations will know when a suit to challenge an or-
ganization's tax-exempt status may be appropriate.
247 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 667.
248 See Slee, 42 F.2d at 185.
2149 See Church of Scientology, 823 F.2d at 1312-13.
..0 See Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 852, 854.
281 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 545; "Americans United", 477 F.2d at 1180.

